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The paper questions the notion that the diffusion of electronic  commerce  will lead to
disintermediation. Rather than interpreting intermediation as a single service it is pointed
out that intermediaries can provide a number of services. The analysis based on the New
Institutional Economics, Market Microstructure Theory, and Information Economics
shows that the three intermediation services studied are, generally, not under threat by the
diffusion of electronic commerce. The overall effects on intermediation depend on the




The notion that electronic commerce will lead to disintermediation seems to be widely
accepted in the scientific  community
2 and well established in the popular debate. It is
frequently  argued  that  online-consumers will interact directly with online-suppliers and,
hence, prices would decrease due to the disappearance of margins calculated by intermediaries.
Sarkar,  Butler,  Steinfield  (1995)  call  this the Threatened Intermediaries Hypothesis:
                                                
1 The present study is part of the research  project "Mediamatikpolitik f￿r die Digitale ￿konomie (Engl. A
Mediamatics Policy for the Digital Economy)", funded by the Austrian Ministry of Sciences and Transport and
conducted by ICE. I have to thank Michael Latzer  for valuable comments on an earlier  draft. The usual
disclaimer applies.
2 E.g. Benjamin, Wigand (1995, p. 68): ￿When appropriate information technology can  reach  the  consumer
directly ... the manufacturer can use the NII [National Information Infrastructure] to leap over all intermediaries.￿
Picot, Bortenl￿nger, R￿hrl (1997, p. 113): ￿With the support of information and communication technology,
principals  can acquire the agent￿s superior problem-solving capabilities, thus enabling them to fulfil the
originally delegated tasks on their own. Agents will become increasingly obsolete.￿Intermediaries minimise high transaction costs which prevail in traditional trade. E-commerce
reduces transaction costs. Therefore, many intermediaries will become obsolete.
The scope of this paper is to analyse the structure of intermediation by methods of the New
Institutional  Economics,  Market Microstructure Theory, and Information Economics and
debate the expected effects of the proliferation of electronic commerce. The main fallacy of the
Threatened Intermediaries Hypothesis is its interpretation of intermediation as a single service
rather than a number of different services. Therefore, the effects of the diffusion of electronic
commerce on each of the intermediation services have to be studied  before one can draw
conclusions on e-commerce and the structure of intermediation based on their relative
importance. The paper is structured along the following lines:
A definition of electronic commerce is presented in section 1. The notion of disintermediation
will be discussed as well.
Intermediaries provide a number of services. Three of which are identified and further analysed
in section 2: (1) hold inventory to provide the service of immediacy and insurance against
systematic valuation risk, (2) reduce asymmetric information by establishing a reputation, (3)
gather, organise, and evaluate information which is dispersed in society. The effects of the
diffusion of electronic commerce on each of these characteristics of intermediation will be
analysed. Furthermore, its effects on the relative costs of internal provision versus a principal
agent relation will be discussed. There are, of course, many more services intermediaries offer.
3
To reach a more general conclusion about the future of intermediation more intermediation
services have to be analysed.
Section 3 summarises the results and concludes the paper.
                                                
3 Sarkar, Butler, Steinfield (1995) offer a list of other intermediation services. They distinguish between services
that benefit consumers (e.g. assistance in search and evaluation, needs assessment and product matching, risk
reduction, and product distribution/delivery) and those that benefit producers  (e.g.  creating and disseminating1. A DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND
DISINTERMEDIATION
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
There is no generally accepted definition of electronic commerce. The overview presented in
Box 1 covers international institutions  (e.g. OECD, WTO), national ministries (e.g.  MITI,
DTI), researchers (e.g. Wigand), and a computer  magazine (e.g. Wired Magazine). The
selection  represents institutions and individuals that  are  quite influential in the  areas of
politics, research, and public opinion, respectively.
Box 1
Electronic Commerce Definitions
￿It [electronic commerce] is concerned specifically with business occurring over networks which
use non-proprietary protocols that are established through an open standard setting process such
as the Internet. As used here, the term ￿business￿ broadly means all activity that generates value
both within a firm (internally) and with suppliers and customers (externally). In this sense it would
include internal networks (e.g. intranets) as well as networks that extend to a limited number of
participants (e.g. extranets). Some of this activity may result in monetary transaction and some
will  not. To assess  the economic impact of e-commerce more fully, that portion of the
infrastructure which is primarily dedicated to such activity is also included.￿ (OECD 1999, p. 28).
￿Broadly speaking, electronic commerce includes any form of economic activity conducted via
electronic connections.￿ (Wigand 1997, p. 2).
￿Through the development of information technology, such efforts  towards the development of
information society have resulted in the present introduction of electronic commerce, or, that is
to say, attempts to replace all economic activity with  that  based on digital  information are
becoming the main focus.￿ (MITI 1997, p. 1).
                                                                                                                                                        
product information and creating product awareness,  influencing consumer purchases, providing customer
information, reducing exposure to risk, and reducing costs of distribution through transaction scale economies).￿E-commerce: Doing Business on the network. More and more companies are making the web
their storefront. It￿s cheap, global, and quick, with no margin-sapping middlemen. That￿s why
forecasters predict that online-retail transactions will explode, reaching $ 10 billion annually by
2000.  And retail sales are merely part of the picture. While only a minority of netusers  have
made a purchase online (security is still a big  fear), the vast majority have used it to research
which products to buy offline.
The mail-order catalogue industry is one obvious target. Online retailers don￿t face the costs of
printing or mailing paper, nor do they pay people to wait by phones for orders to come in. The
hottest markets for consumer sales are computer equipment (...), books, music,  travel, and
finance. ...￿ (Wired magazine, Encyclopaedia of the New Economy)
 ￿Electronic commerce may be simply defined as the production, advertising, sale, and distribution
of products via telecommunication networks. Most of the discussion is limited to the Internet ￿
the  medium with which electronic commerce is primarily associated. The study  points  out,
however, that earlier technological innovations  such as the telephone and fax have been used in
similar, albeit more limited, ways to conduct business electronically, and future directions in which
technology may lead remain uncertain.￿ (WTO 1998, p. 1).
￿Electronic commerce ￿ using an electronic network to simplify and speed up all stages of the
business process, from design and making, to buying, selling and delivery ￿ is revolutionising the
way business is done.￿ (DTI 1998, p. 1).
The definitions differ  with respect to the media  under consideration. Some focus on the
Internet, some include all sorts of direct electronic distribution channels (e.g. TV-shopping),
and others include all forms of electronic market places (e.g. electronic trading systems on
stock exchanges).
A few of them distinguish between different phases of a transaction, such as: (1) information
and search, (2) negotiation and contracting, (3) settlement (delivery and/or payment). These
more differentiated definitions are important to analyse certain policy problems such as the
impact of digital money on the money demand  function or the stability of the payment
system.When estimating the  volume of electronic commerce the  differences of the  underlying
definitions  are of critical importance. Some studies (OECD 1999) include infrastructure
expenditure (e.g. costs of installing a Web-site), volume of sales via a pre-specified electronic
media (e.g. Internet), and do not distinguish between business-to-business  and business-to-
consumer electronic commerce. The decision as to whether a certain transaction should be
included in the volume of electronic commerce usually rests on the occurrence of the phases
(2) negotiation and contracting and/or (3) settlement over the pre-specified electronic channel
(e.g. Internet). Interestingly, the mere occurrence of phase (1) information and search via the
Internet is usually not enough to include a transaction in the volume of electronic commerce.
But in most of the arguments on disintermediation the reduction of information and search
costs due to the diffusion of electronic commerce play a central role. The empirical results
building on different definitions of electronic commerce differ widely.
For the purpose of this paper a broad definition of e-commerce will be used.
￿Electronic commerce denotes the seamless application of information and
communication technology from its point of origin to its end point along the entire
value chain of business processes conducted electronically and designed to enable the
accomplishment of a business goal. These processes may be partial or complete and
may encompass business-to-business, as well as business-to-consumer and consumer-
to-business transactions.￿ (Wigand 1997, p. 5)
The paper focuses on the effects of the increased utilisation of information and communication
technology in business transactions. Electronic commerce is one of the fastest growing areas of
application of these technologies. Whereas EDI (electronic data interchange) usually involved a
certain number of long-term business partners electronic commerce via the Internet also
includes consumers.
The effects of electronic commerce on intermediation will also depend on the characteristics of
the goods under consideration: High degrees of standardisation, a low complexity of valuation,and ease of description  are  pre-requisites to distribute goods via electronic commerce.
Obviously, the goods that  can be sold this way largely  consist of all  the  goods  that are
distributed via catalogue sales and TV shopping channels (e.g. books, fashion, CDs, travel
arrangements etc.). The production of a catalogue (or a TV commercial presentation) is costly
and time consuming relative to producing and up-dating a Web-site. Therefore, the set of
goods that can be distributed via electronic commerce is larger than the set of goods distributed
via catalogue sales and TV shopping  channels. It also includes all  goods  for which the
production of a catalogue would be either (1) excessively expensive, or (2) excessively time
consuming (e.g. stock market information services etc.). Furthermore, it includes all digitised
goods  for which the delivery of hard copies (e.g.  software CDs) via mail is excessively
expensive and time consuming. Therefore, mostly intermediaries dealing in these sets of goods
can be expected to be directly affected by electronic commerce. The diffusion of information
and communication technology can also influence the set of goods which can be distributed via
e-commerce. This problem, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
To evaluate the effects of electronic commerce on intermediation a typology of effects of
electronic commerce
4 is necessary.
Electronic Communication Effect: The costs of processing existing information decrease. More
digitised information can be processed within the same period of time.
Electronic Integration Effect: In addition to increase the efficiency of information processing
electronic commerce is also expected to lead to an integration of different processes of
collecting, manipulating, and transmitting information. Thereby, existing digitised information
stored in various places can be interconnected.
                                                
4 See Haenel, Brand, Knothe, Bloechl 1999.Electronic Brokerage Effect: The electronic market place can be described as a number of
meeting places where large numbers of buyers and sellers interact.
DISINTERMEDIATION
￿Disintermediation is the displacement or elimination of market intermediaries,
enabling direct trade with buyers and consumers without agents.￿ (Wigand 1997, p.
4).
The elimination of intermediaries can have one of two causes: There is no longer demand for
the services provided by the intermediary or the provider of these services is integrated into
another company at a different step in the value chain (e.g. the acquisition of a distributor by a
producer) and the service will be produced internally. In section 2 the effects of electronic
commerce on three different types of services provided by intermediaries are studied.
2. THE NATURE OF INTERMEDIATION AND THE EFFECTS OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Which are the services offered by an intermediary? Why is there demand for intermediation?
One prominent feature of an intermediary is to act as a communicator of consumer preferences
and, on the other hand, to inform consumers about new products and their characteristics (e.g.
quality, price, function etc.). Thereby, they bear some of the inventory risks of producers and
reduce  the  search  costs for consumers. But this is by no means  the only service an
intermediary offers. Others include ensuring compliance with  consumer  protection  (and
bearing the related risks), customer service, inventory management (and bearing the  related
risks), distribution (and bearing related risks), and costs savings due to economies of scale in
transportation or distribution in general.The relationships between producers (or buyer/seller) and intermediaries are frequently
interpreted as principal-agent relations. What are the variables that  influence the decision to
engage in a principal-agent relation?
Due to opportunistic behaviour of the agent the principal is confronted with agency costs
which are caused by informational problems like moral hazard (hidden or unverifiable action),
adverse selection (hidden information) and hidden intentions. Moral hazard refers to a
situation in which an agent receives a pre-specified compensation given a certain  state of
nature which occurs with a certain  probability. If this probability is not exogenous
(independent of the agent￿s actions) to the agent￿s decision  problem the pre-specified
compensation must also take into account how a specific compensation scheme affects the
decisions and actions of the  agent.
5 The straight-forward solution to this problem is to
condition the pre-specified compensation on the agent￿s actions. Unfortunately, this is not
always possible since these actions may be very costly to verify. In such cases of asymmetric
information specific contractual arrangements (i.e. incentive schemes) can be employed to
ensure that the agent  complies with the actions set forth in the contract. Though, these
contracts are the results of maximisation problems that incorporate more  constraints than
similar problems in settings without asymmetric information.
Adverse selection means  that different groups of agents would be faced  with different
probabilities of being of a certain  type in a certain  state of nature.
6 Therefore, any pre-
specified compensation for a certain state of nature would have to be conditioned on an
agent￿s characteristics. The agents are informed about their types. Unfortunately, these
characteristics can again be very costly to verify for the principal. A failure to do so might
result in losses for the principal. Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976) discuss the issue of adverse
                                                
5 See Kreps 1990, pp. 577.
6 See Kreps 1990, pp. 625 for more details - e.g. the underlying equilibrium concepts, the role of pre-
commitment.selection in the context of an insurance market with asymmetric information. A single contract
for high and low risk individuals which is based on the average probability of the two groups
to have an accident will not be demanded by low risk individuals. They would consider the
premium too high in relation to their probability to have an accident. Therefore, they would
not choose the contract. Consequentely, only high risk individuals would choose the contract
and their premium would be too low in relation to their propbability to have an accident.
Therefore, the expected profit of the contract would be negative for the insurance company.
Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976) argue that there might be no equilibrium at all under asymmetric
information. Contractual arrangements to handle this problem of hidden information include
actions taken by the agents (signalling) or actions taken by the principal (screening through
self-selection mechanisms). In the  model of Rothschild, Stiglitz (1976) the screening
mechanism  consists of separate contracts for high  and low risk individuals which are
structured in a way that high risk individuals are indifferent between the contracts and low risk
individuals choose a contract which does not offer full insurance.
The problem of hidden intentions refers to a situation in which the expected benefits for the
principal depend on the agent￿s intentions (e.g. time period a new employee intends to work
for a company) and the establishment of a principal-agent relation involves sunk costs for the
principal (e.g. a specific investment like training to a newly hired employee).
7 The investment
is expected to be profitable if the principal-agent relation exists for a certain minimum period
of time. Unless the agent can assure the principal that it is not her intention to end the relation
before the end of that minimum period of time the principal might not be willing to bear the
risk associated with the investment. Contractual arrangements to resolve this problem include
the  ￿exchange of hostages￿ through mutually specific investments (e.g.  The newly hired
employee may be obliged to compensate the employer for a part of the training if she wants to
quit within a pre-specified period of time.).
                                                
7 See Picot, Bortenl￿nger, R￿hrl 1997, p. 112.The most obvious way to reduce agency costs
8, though, is to abolish the agent altogether. This
would imply that the principal has to perform the task herself, thereby,  reducing costs by
saving the agent￿s compensation and the principal￿s share of the agency costs, but incurring
additional production costs.
The  agent  must therefore have a comparative  advantage in performing the task under
consideration, otherwise the principal would have no incentive to engage in a principal-agent
relation in the first place. The marginal efficiency gains resulting from the employment of the
agent (i.e. marginal costs of procurement minus the marginal costs of internal production)
must compensate the principal for her share of the agency costs and the agent￿s compensation
at the margin. For each service the effects of the diffusion of e-commerce on the produce or
buy decision will be analysed.
The following section is devoted to a description of three services intermediaries can offer:
In subsection A. (The Service of Immediacy and Insurance against Systematic Valuation Risk)
the role of intermediaries in markets which are characterised by a random arrival of buy and
sell orders is studied while in subsection B. (The Reduction of Asymmetric Information ￿
Reputation) the structure of intermediation in markets characterised by asymmetric
information is analysed. In subsection C. (Informational Efficiency) intermediaries are
interpreted as agents who gather, organise, and evaluate knowledge that is dispersed in society.
                                                
8 Broadly speaking, these are  the costs associated with overcoming the problem of asymmetric information
between principal and agent and include costs of structuring, monitoring and enforcing a contract and the related
risks.A. Inventory ￿ The Services of Immediacy and Insurance against Systematic Valuation
Risk
In markets which are characterised by a random arrival of buy  and sell orders traders are
confronted with uncertainty regarding the possibility to trade at a specific moment in time.
9
Since each buyer has to wait until a sell order arrives at the market there is a positive
probability that a buy order cannot be executed immediately. Similarly, each seller has to wait
until a buy order arrives such that he can complete the desired transaction.
Early and quite simple solutions to the double coincidence of timing
10 problem are organised
markets, i.e. prearranged trading posts where market  participants  meet at pre-determined
times. These social artefacts increase the probability that a trader will actually meet a potential
trading partner. Albeit, this reduction of uncertainty comes at a price ￿ the organised market
takes place only at certain  points of time  (e.g. once a month). Thus, traders lose the
opportunity to trade whenever they feel the desire to do so ￿ they lose immediacy. It is in this
situation that some participants assume the roles of market makers who provide the service of
immediacy for other market participants. ￿The specialist market maker interposes himself as a
principal in the market by offsetting the fluctuating imbalances in demand and supply with
purchases or sales for his own account.￿ (Goodhart 1989, p. 5). The market maker always
quotes a price he is willing to buy at and a price he is willing to sell at, irrespective of his own
consumption demand. Apart from absorbing imbalances of buy  and sell orders the market
maker, thereby, performs another important function in a market: He always quotes market
prices and, consequently, increases market transparency  and  provides  insurance against
stochastic price fluctuations.
                                                
9 Throughout the following section it is assumed that all orders are market orders. ￿Market orders are orders to
buy and sell for immediate execution, as opposed to limit orders, which are orders to buy and sell at some pre-
specified price.￿ (O￿Hara 1997, p. 37).
10 See O￿Hara 1997, pp. 3. Double coincidence of timing means that the moment when a seller wants to sell a
unit a buyer wants to buy a unit have to coincide in order to achieve instantaneous market clearing.The consequence of his readiness to buy  and sell is that his inventory position and the
associated holding period are, at least in the very short-run, determined by the trading patterns
of other market participants and, therefore, not at his own discretion. Given that he has fairly
good knowledge of the underlying probability distributions of the arrival rates of buy and sell
orders he will quote ask (sell) and bid (purchase) prices such that the deviations of his actual
inventory from his desired position will cancel out over time as long as the underlying demand
and supply functions do not change. The spread between ask and bid prices will be calculated
to cover the marginal costs of carrying the average or desired inventory position. These consist
of opportunity costs incurred by investing in inventory rather than a productive asset (e.g.
almost riskless government bonds), the associated risk of capital losses due to shifts in the
underlying demand and supply  schedules, and exogenous  transaction costs due to the
processing of orders, settlement, and payment.
If the underlying demand and supply functions can change over time the market maker has to
bear the risk that the value of his inventory position changes. An outward shift of the supply
schedule will result in an increase in the market makers’ inventory that is not caused by a
short-run  imbalance of order  arrival  rates. Therefore, he will  not be able to readjust his
inventory position in accordance with his own underlying preferences unless he readjusts his
ask and bid prices. But the market maker may not always be in the position to judge whether a
deviation of his actual from his planned inventory is a consequence of short-term imbalances
or of a shift in the underlying demand and supply schedules. Therefore, he has to bear the risk
of accumulating inventory when market prices fall and of reducing inventory when market
prices increase. In both cases he would suffer capital losses. Therefore, the market maker has
to have some confidence that he is comparatively well informed since his inventory position is
subject to systematic valuation risks. In the absence of market makers, individual traders
would have to bear the risks associated with unintended inventory positions. Those traders
who are not able to execute their planned market transactions would have to hold an inventory
position (positive or negative) until the transaction can be executed. Therefore, they wouldface systematic  valuation risks themselves. Consequently, the market maker also provides
insurance services for other market participants.
Market microstructure theory originated in financial markets but it can be applied to all sorts
of markets. ￿Assuming that the retailer has some degree of pricing discretion, the retailer acts
in fact as market maker in that good, presenting bid prices to potential sellers and ask prices to
customers.￿ (Goodhart 1989, p. 5).
The provision of the service of immediacy comes at a cost such that participants have to pay
a price for immediacy, a price to cover the costs of intermediation. The market maker must not
only  hold an inventory position in the good(s) under consideration to be able to sell on
demand but he must also have access to the means of payment to be able to buy on demand.
His marginal costs will consist of opportunity costs of holding an additional unit of inventory
and securing access to an additional unit of the means of payment (e.g. cash holdings or
standby credit arrangements). In addition, the market maker will employ certain resources to
provide his service, e.g. labor, office space, communication equipment and services.
THE EFFECTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ON MARKET MAKING
It has been shown that the random fluctuations of the arrival rates of buy and sell orders are a
potential reason for intermediation to exist in a market characterised by low probabilities of a
double coincidence of timing. How will the increasing usage of advanced communication and
information technology affect the double coincidence of timing and, thereby, the demand for
this particular intermediation service?
The time pattern of buy and sell order arrival rates is a function of individual preferences and
quite independent of any technological innovations. Arrival rates reflect the desire of traders to
sell or buy ￿ the willingness to pay a price of immediacy reveals that individuals want to do so
as and when they want to. There is no reason to assume that the communication and
integration effect will reduce individuals￿ time preference rates or their risk preferences. Theywill, ceteris paribus, continue to pay a premium for immediacy and for the smoothing of price
variations. The direct effect of the diffusion of advanced communication and information
technology on intermediation is negligible in markets which are characterised by stochastic
fluctuations of the arrival rates of buy and sell orders.
But, on the other hand, there is no doubt that a reduction in communication and information
costs will reduce marginal costs of immediacy and, thereby, the spread between the bid and
the ask prices. Therefore, the marginal costs of intermediation (the price of immediacy) will
fall if the market for the underlying service of immediacy is sufficiently competitive. These
price reductions and the brokerage effect of electronic commerce might attract new traders and,
thereby, increase liquidity in the market. Due to decreasing communication and information
costs market access might be affordable and efficient for  more  potential traders. Market
liquidity would increase further. The effects of an increase in market liquidity on the double
coincidence of timing depends on the parameters of the underlying probability distributions of
the arrival rates of buy and sell orders. Although the brokerage effect of electronic commerce
will result in larger trading volume it does not automatically imply that the probability that the
market clears each period increases. Intuitively, the following situation can occur to a seller:
Though, the arrival of a potential  trading  partner (a buyer) becomes more likely the
probability of another seller competing to do business with the same buyer increases as well.
This, again, either leads to price volatility due to short-term market imbalances or to the loss
of immediacy. Therefore, the  increase in market liquidity does not imply a reduction in
demand for the services of immediacy and insurance against systematic valuation risk.
INTERNAL PRODUCTION VS. PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATION
Intermediation is efficient as long as the marginal efficiency gains resulting from outsourcing
the provision of the service of immediacy compensate the principal for her share of the agency
costs  and the agent￿s compensation at the margin. Therefore, disintermediation by internal
production occurs if one of the three following statements is true, ceteris paribus:I.  Electronic commerce reduces the marginal costs of internal provision of the service of
immediacy.
II.  Electronic commerce increases the agent￿s marginal costs of provision of the service of
immediacy.
  The  marginal  costs of providing the service of immidiacy consist of opportunity costs
incurred by investing in inventory rather than a productive asset (e.g.  almost riskless
government bonds), the associated risk of capital losses due to shifts in the underlying demand
and  supply  schedules, and exogenous  transaction costs due to the processing of orders,
settlement, and payment. The communication and integration effects (i.e. process innovations)
will tend to reduce the marginal costs of both, the principal and the agent, as they  reduce
exogenous transaction costs. At the same time, opportunity costs and the costs of bearing the
risk of capital losses will be unaffected by the diffusion of electronic commerce. Therefore, the
comparative advantage of the intermediary will prevail.
  Internal production would imply risk bearing by the principal rather than shifting it on to the
agent. The relative efficiency of such an arrangement depends on the relative degrees of risk
aversion. The more risk averse principal pays an ￿insurance premium￿ such that the less risk
averse agent bears some of the principal￿s risk. The diffusion of electronic commerce will not
alter the relative risk aversions of the principal and the agent. Therefore, the efficiency of
shifting (at least some) risk associated with  holding an inventory position on to the
intermediary will remain unaffected.
III. Electronic commerce increases marginal agency costs or the agent￿s compensation at the
margin.
The monitoring costs incurred by the principal will decrease due to the communication and
integration effect. If the market for intermediation is sufficiently competitive the agent￿s
compensation will shrink due to the reduction of marginal costs of intermediation.Therefore, the diffusion of electronic commerce favours principal agent relations rather than
internal production. The diffusion of electronic commerce is, therefore, not likely to result in
disintermediation by internal provision of the services of immediacy and insurance against
systematic valuation risk
B. The Reduction of Asymmetric Information - Reputation
Many  markets are characterised by imperfect information of traders about the quality of
goods and services (including auxiliary and complementary services ￿ e.g. fulfilment, privacy
and consumer protection policies) traded. In many markets goods and services are
heterogeneous and asymmetric information prevails between buyers and sellers. The  most
popular example is the market for lemons (market for used cars).
11 Rationally, buyers who
know less about the quality of a used car than the seller will base their willingness to pay on
expectations concerning the quality of the used car under consideration. These expectations
will be based on the subjective probability distribution of the quality of cars. Since buyers are
unable to distinguish between high and low quality cars they will pay a uniform price at which
some cars will be under-priced while others will be overpriced. If the market price falls below
a certain threshold the sellers of high quality cars will withdraw from the market. Since this is
anticipated by the buyers they will rationally lower their prices to reflect lower expected
quality of the remaining cars.
12 As this might lead another group of sellers at the high quality
segment to withdraw from the market this process could lead to an equilibrium in which no
cars are exchanged at all. This equilibrium is individually rational even though it is less efficient
socially than an equilibrium in which information would be symmetric. This result is due to
                                                
11 See Kreps 1990, pp. 625.
12 Buyers can anticipate the withdrawal of high quality cars  from the market as the market price  falls if the
following conditions prevail: (1) The sellers thresholds to sell  („willingness to accept“) are ordered according to
the quality of the cars and (2) buyers know about that fact. Since sellers are informed about the quality of their
cars these conditions are not restrictive.the negative externality exerted by the sellers of low quality cars on the sellers of high quality
cars. This is the familiar problem of adverse selection.
One of the underlying assumptions of this argument is that individuals trade only once or at
least very occasionally. Otherwise, repetition would enable buyers to obtain the relevant
information by a trial and error process ￿ given that the expected losses due to errors do not
out-weight the expected gains from improving the buyers information at the margin. At the
same time repetition is a necessary condition
13 for sellers to invest in reputation, i.e. to forego
present profit by revealing private information truthfully in order to avoid under-pricing by
prospective customers. Establishing a reputation for selling high quality products can be
interpreted as an investment decision and is, therefore, nonsensical if there are no future
customers or if the discount factor of the seller is very low (<< 1).
14
In a market which is characterised by random sequences of buy and sell orders the probability
to trade with the same counterparty is small, i.e. repetition is unlikely. Therefore, there is no
incentive for sellers to establish a reputation for selling high quality  goods.  The costs of
gathering information can be quite high for individual buyers. At the same time they only trade
very infrequently with the same counterparty  which implies that the share of information
costs for each transaction is very high. Since information has the characteristic of non-rivalry
in consumption the following  market microstructure is efficiency enhancing:  Certain
specialists act as information gathering agents for buyers. Even if their information costs are as
high as for each individual buyer the specialists transacts more frequently due to his position
as a middleman and can, therefore, spread these fixed  costs over a larger  number of
transactions. Thereby, the middleman reduces transaction costs per transaction and avoids
                                                
13 ￿It is enough that the party [ seller]  who puts the other party [ buyer] at risk repeats  the transaction fairly
frequently, has a substantial amount at stake in the execution of any single transaction, and has her performance
observed by potential future trading partners.￿ (Kreps 1990, p. 761).
14 Noisy variables and fixed, finite horizons can complicate matters  (see Kreps 1990, pp.531) but are not
discussed further in the analysis presented here.inefficient duplication of information gathering  activities  among  buyers. In addition the
specialist  might  develop a comparative advantage in information  gathering  such  that
transaction costs can be reduced even further.
15 Therefore, economies of scale in information
gathering prevail up to some specific firm size.
16 ￿In those markets where most traders only
enter at rare intervals, the markets will be augmented by information-purveying specialists
and/or markets will tend to be high cost and fragile.￿ (Goodhart 1989, p. 21).
Not only buyers can profit from the characteristic of non-rivalry in consumption. It might also
be efficiency enhancing for sellers to delegate  the task of establishing a reputation to an
intermediary since the higher number of transactions enable the intermediary to spread the
costs of establishing a reputation over a larger  number of transactions. Thereby, the
middleman  reduces transaction costs per transaction and avoids inefficient duplication of
efforts with respect to establishing a reputation among sellers. In addition the specialist might
develop a comparative advantage in establishing a reputation such that transaction costs can be
reduced even further. An intermediary of good repute can shelter sellers of high quality goods,
at least partly, from the negative externality exerted on them by sellers of low quality goods.
So far, the problem of asymmetric information has not been solved completely  since the
specialist market maker still enjoys an informational advantage vis-￿-vis the buyers. But since
he transacts very frequently the market maker  has an incentive to establish a reputation.
Repetition  enables buyers to learn about the quality of the goods  sold by a specific
intermediary via a trial-and-error process.
17 Any negative experience ￿ concerning quality -
will be punished by market participants ￿ buyers and/or sellers - via a diversion of trading
volume from one market maker to another. Due to the higher  number of transactions an
                                                
15 See Diamond 1984.
16 In the single product case this would imply a natural monopoly if the market size is below this threshold.
17 The loss to the intermediary is even larger if negative experience can be communicated amongst buyers and
amongst sellers.intermediary conducts the amount at stake for him is higher than for each individual seller.
Thus, his commitment to high quality is more credible. This  immediately  points out two
necessary conditions: The market for intermediation must be sufficiently competitive since
market power would result in a reduction of incentives to establish a reputation. Furthermore,
the market makers must not be completely homogeneous to enable buyers and sellers to link
counterparty characteristics between different points of time.
THE JOINT PROVISION OF THE SERVICES OF IMMEDIACY AND OF REDUCING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
It was pointed out before that market makers need to be relatively well informed about the
underlying supply  and demand curves in order to avoid capital losses due to shifts in the
underlying equilibrium price. This implies, in its own right, that they will also have to be quite
well informed about the characteristics of the good traded. In addition, they  are frequently
holding large inventory positions in the good which confronts them with the risk of stocking
low quality products. In order to avoid losses they would have to sell those low quality
products overpriced which, in turn, implies that they would risk their reputation. A market
maker,  therefore, faces strong incentives to gather  the relevant information about the
underlying product quality. Consequently, there exist strong economies of scope
18 up to some
specific firm size between the provision of the services of immediacy (including insurance
against systematic valuation risk) and of reducing asymmetric information.
THE EFFECTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ON ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
As pointed out before, the diffusion of advanced communication and information technology
will not alter traders preferences per se. In a market characterised by random order arrival rates
                                                
18 The fixed costs of information gathering imply economies of scale which, in combination with economies of
scope of the provision of the two services in one company, could lead to a natural monopoly. Decreasing average
incremental costs of each product plus economies of scope at the output level of market demand are sufficient
conditions to ensure the existence of a natural monopoly. But the size of output up to which the production
function of a combined firm exhibits subadditivity may be well below total market volume.  Therefore, a
competitive market structure is not contradictory to above analysis.repetition  will remain unlikely. Intermediation will, therefore, remain  necessary to provide
incentives for establishing a reputation by guaranteeing repetition.
19 But due to a reduction in
information costs (due to the communication and integration effects) it will be cheaper for
individual traders to acquire the necessary information to overcome  the  informational
asymmetries between buyers and sellers. But at the same time also market makers will be
confronted with lower information costs. Their comparative advantage is likely to remain, i.e.
they still face lower information costs than individual traders. And, in addition, they still
spread their information costs over a larger number of individual transactions and they avoid
the  inefficient duplication of information efforts. Thereby, intermediation is still more
efficient, even though, the production function might  change  considerably due to the
communication and integration effect.
The communication and integration effects reduce the costs of communicating and integrating
the  experience of multiple customers (e.g.  user groups). Therefore, it could be argued,
repetition might not be crucial anymore. But, even if an individual buyer  will not have the
opportunity to trade again with the same seller the latter will have an incentive to establish a
reputation and to play by the rules. Otherwise, the information about non-compliance would
spread easily and the seller would lose his reputation.  Even though, the communication and
integration effect could increase the incentives for sellers to establish a reputation it is still
more efficient to delegate this task to an intermediary since he spreads the associated costs
over a larger number of transactions  and avoids duplication of efforts  among  sellers.
Furthermore, the argument rests on another crucial assumption: Namely, that all information
transmitted by other buyers is reliable. The asymmetric information problem is merely shifted
from the sellers to those buyers who report their experiences. For fellow buyers it could be
quite costly to verify this information.
                                                
19 At least the party (middlemen) that puts the other party (buyer) at risk repeatedly engages in transactions.The brokerage effect will result in an increase in the number of market participants and, thus,
reduce the probability that either partner to a transaction will trade with an identical trading
partner repeatedly. Consequently, it will become increasingly difficult to establish a
reputation for a seller. Therefore, the demand for intermediation tends to increase even in
electronic markets (e.g. eTrust, Trusted Third Party Services and online-retailers).
INTERNAL PRODUCTION VS. PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATION
Intermediation is efficient as long as the marginal efficiency gains resulting from outsourcing
the task of establishing of a reputation compensate the principal for her share of the agency
costs  and the agent￿s compensation at the margin. Therefore, disintermediation by internal
production occurs if one of the three following statements is true, ceteris paribus:
I.  Electronic commerce reduces the marginal costs of internal production of the task under
consideration.
II.  Electronic commerce increases the agent￿s marginal costs of production of the task under
consideration.
  The opportunity  costs of establishing a reputation  are the foregone profits of engaging in
opportunistic behaviour. Additional costs are incurred by informing potential trading partners
about past performance. For both, the principal and the agent, the costs are reduced by the
communication and integration effects of electronic commerce. As reputation has the feature of
non-rivalry in consumption an intermediary can use his reputation to trade in various goods
and services. By increasing the number of transactions he can increase the credibility of his
commitment and the  overall payoff of reputation. Therefore, the diffusion of electronic
commerce tends to reduce the risks associated with an investment in reputation and reducing
the amortisation time as long as the  middleman  acts in accordance  with his commitment.
Overall, the diffusion of electronic commerce is unlikely to reduce marginal efficiency gainsfrom outsourcing the task of establishing a reputation as it allows for specialisation and avoids
the duplication efforts among sellers.
III. Electronic commerce increases marginal agency costs or the agent￿s compensation at the
margin.
The  communication and integration effects  could reduce the  marginal  costs of informing
potential trading partners about past performance of the intermediary. In a sufficiently
competitive market this implies that the agent￿s compensation falls. Monitoring costs will be
reduced as well.
Electronic commerce does neither tend to decrease  the  relative  marginal  costs of internal
production nor does it increase the marginal costs associated with a principal agent relation.
Therefore, there is no indication of disintermediation by internal provision of the service of
overcoming asymmetric information by establishing a reputation.
C. Informational Efficiency
THE DISPERSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY
The rational economic  activity of a firm is based on the relationship between expected
marginal costs (incremental costs due to the production of an additional unit of output) and
expected marginal return (incremental return due to the sale of an additional unit of output).
As long as marginal costs are below marginal return the firm will increase output until the two
are equal. At this point the firm maximises expected profits.
20 The main problem, though, is
not to solve the relevant maximisation problem mathematically or to derive the optimal output
based on the assumption that the firm knows the (expected) demand and supply  functions it
faces.
                                                
20 If the firm is not risk neutral it maximises expected utility of profits.The  supply schedule is derived from the minimisation of costs at each level of output.
Therefore, it is mostly determined by (i) technology and (ii) factor prices. The demand
schedule  the firm faces is determined by (i) consumer preferences, (ii) consumer budget
constraints, and (iii) the behaviour of the firm￿s competitors. To assume that this knowledge is
given to the firm at no costs can only be misleading. Rather, it is the firm￿s main challenge to
gather the relevant information on which to base the derivation of the optimal, profit or utility
maximising production decision.
“The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined
precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
possess.￿ (Hayek 1971, p. 17).
According to Hayek,  all  economic  activity is planning.  Thus, a firm is also a planning
institution. The main questions therefore are: What is the optimal structure of intermediation
with  regard to informational efficiency? How will the diffusion of electronic  commerce
influence the intermediaries￿ role with regard to informational efficiency?
Hayek intended to show that centralised economic planning was indeed impossible due to
informational obstacles any central planning bureau would face. According to Hayek, it is the
distinct advantage of an economic order based on decentralised planning that the producer of a
specific good does not have to gather all the relevant information by himself. It is sufficient if
it is communicated to him.
“ ... in a society in which many people collaborate, this planning,  whoever does it,
will in some measure have to be based on knowledge which, in the first instance, is
not given to the planner but to somebody  else, which somehow will  have to be
conveyed to the planner.￿ (Hayek 1971, p. 18).At any given time, the body of knowledge which could be relevant to the planner is, of course,
enormous. A considerable proportion of his resources would have to be directed not only to
gathering and organising but also to evaluating the relative  importance of each  bit of new
information. But for most changes of the economic environment the underlying details are of
no importance: The crucial information is whether or not a profit opportunity for the planner
arises. This is conveyed to him by changes in relative prices. The price system co-ordinates
the  economic  activities, the decentralised decisions of consumers, producers, and
intermediaries. For most goods and services in the economy the causes of such changes are
only of secondary importance.
But for the goods and services which are of direct relevance for a certain company knowledge
of the causes of such changes forms the very basis for a learned decision. To react properly to
changes in relative prices some background information is required: Will they be temporary or
permanent? Can these changes be influenced (e.g. reversed) at all? If so, how can  they be
influenced? Has the legal or tax framework changed? For a publisher the causes of a change in
oil prices is of secondary importance. Any increase of the fuel price might lead to a more
efficient use of fuel by the car fleet of the publisher but not to a change in business strategy. A
drop in the prices of economics  textbooks in Korea, on the other hand, could lead to a
reorientation of the publisher￿s Korean activities if the changes seem to be permanent. To
react properly the publisher needs to gain  more information about the causes of the price
changes.
“Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all
knowledge. But a little reflection will show that there is beyond question a body of
very important but  u n o r g a n i z e d  knowledge  which cannot  possibly be  called
scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and space. It is with respect to this that practically every
individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique
information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be madeonly if the decision depending on it are left to him or are made  with his active co-
operation.￿ (Hayek 1971, p. 20; emphasis added).
The particular knowledge of time and space includes information about any newly established
local competitors, and changes of the local economic conditions which affect consumer demand
(e.g. tax laws, fiscal measures, regulations, changes in consumer preferences etc.) ￿ any profit
opportunities which arise for an entrepreneur. Some of the information might be considered
even worthless by those who have access to it. An entrepreneurial intermediary learning of
some particularities of time and space  might regard the exploitation of this informational
advantage a profit opportunity.
It is crucial to understand that this knowledge does not exist in any organised form. There is
no individual agency which is in the possession of all the relevant information. A firm (or an
entrepreneur, a producer) has to be in the market to perceive of the particular circumstances of
time and space. If there are substantial economies of scale it is inefficient to produce solely for
the local market (Assuming that local demand is below the optimal output under economies of
scale). In such a case the producer can only gain knowledge of the particular circumstances of
local markets via a representative, an intermediary.
21 It is one of the central features of the
intermediary￿s commercial activity to gather, organise and evaluate the  knowledge of local
particularities.
This forms the basis for his decision to bundle, un-bundle and re-bundle goods and services for
which he acts as an intermediary. The value added by his activities is that his supply is ￿made
to measure￿ for the local market. Consumers are willing to pay for this service because their
preferences are matched more closely. At the same time producers profit because they share
some of the risks associated with their inventory with the intermediary and would otherwise
                                                
21 This is not to say, though, that this commercial activity must be accomplished externally. Alternatively, a
subsidiary might be established.lack important information. The producer does not have to gather, organise, and evaluate all
the relevant information which forms the basis for the intermediaries decision. It is sufficient if
any  changes in demand and supply  conditions of a local market  are communicated to the
producer via an intermediary. ￿ ... intermediaries also provide  valuable  information  about
customers. ... Even in cases where producers do not receive explicit consumer information,
retail intermediaries implicitly provide information processing services by aggregating demand
information from a variety of local markets.￿ (Sarkar, Butler, Steinfield 1995, p. 7). Without
intermediation the producer would have to gather, organise, and evaluate the relevant
knowledge of the local markets by himself. This  centralised decision making process is less
efficient than a decentralised one. The informational burden is shared between the producer
and the intermediary.
A Korean book retailer, for example, knows more about the local particularities of the Korean
book market than a publisher in the USA. Instead of engaging in costly  market research the
USA publisher sells to the Korean retailer who has an informational advantage.
Any  perceived profit opportunities will result in a change of the  intermediaries  inventory
position. Misperceptions with regard to this profit opportunity will reduce the intermediaries
profits but leave those of the producer unaffected.
22 Apart from the aforementioned effect of
risk sharing, this also represents an incentive compatible mechanism to shelter the principal
(producer) from insufficient effort by the agent (intermediary).
Williamson (1990, p. 125) argues that car sales depend on specific local knowledge. As more
people exchanged their old cars for new ones special local knowledge became more important.
Since unified governance would reduce the incentives to examine the used cars appropriately
the US automobile industry established a franchise system.
                                                
22 The arrangement that the retailer bears all the risk of devaluation of his inventory is wide spread but other,
more complex arrangements are feasible (see Sarkar, Butler, Steinfield 1995).It is the central task of intermediation to gather, organise, and evaluate the  knowledge of
particular circumstances of time and space and to communicate it to producers. As an
intermediary specialises in the acquisition of relevant knowledge he gains a competitive
advantage due to prevailing economies of scale in the production of information.
23
Once the intermediary has accomplished his task it seems that producers and consumers could
do easily without him since the necessary knowledge has already been gathered, organised, and
conveyed to the market participants. To conclude that the intermediary would now be under
threat is not justified since in a dynamic economy the particular circumstances of time and
space are always and constantly subject to change. To ensure that the producer can adapt to
such changes quickly the necessary information has to be conveyed to him.
THE JOINT PROVISION OF THE  SERVICES OF IMMEDIACY,  OF REDUCING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND
INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY
The provision of the services of immediacy and of reducing  asymmetric information were
shown to exhibit strong economies of scope since both  involved being very well informed
about the characteristics of the good traded (see p. 16). Gathering, organising, and evaluating
the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and space was identified to be one the
central tasks of intermediaries. At the same time, market makers need to be relatively well
informed about the underlying supply and demand curves (see pp. 9) which also implies that
they  need to obtain the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and  space.
Therefore, strong economies of scope up to a specific firm size prevail between the provision
of the services of immediacy and of informational efficiency. Consequently, the joint
provision of the three intermediation services discussed in this paper is more efficient than
their provision by three independent intermediaries as the later would inevitably lead to a
duplication of efforts. As long as the aforementioned specific firm size is well below total
                                                
23 See Diamond 1984.market volume a competitive market structure in the relevant market is not contradictory to
the argument.
THE EFFECTS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ON THE DISPERSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY
The electronic communication effect will reduce the costs of communicating and processing
existing information. The electronic integration effect will enable users to interconnect various
sources of existing digitised information. Therefore, the value added by gathering and
organising information will increase. But the dispersion of knowledge will be unaffected by
these consequences of the diffusion of electronic commerce. Particularities of time and space
will still exist. Someone has to gather, organise, and evaluate any information concerning these
particularities.
24 As soon as firms
25 perceive their exploitation as profit opportunities the
relevant knowledge will be communicated via  the price system. Even if the market
infrastructure is an electronic  network price adjustments are  based on changes in excess
demand and excess supply in the local markets. To react properly to such changes producers
need to know their causes. These are conveyed to them by the intermediaries either implicitly
or explicitly. Only when the relevant information is digitised and fed into the electronic
network the efficiency enhancing effects of the diffusion of electronic commerce will become
fully operational. As a result, decentralised planning becomes more efficient.
The consequences of the electronic brokerage effect are entirely different. An electronic market
has its own particular circumstances of time and space. Before electronic markets completely
substitute for traditional markets the diffusion of electronic commerce increases the number of
￿local￿  markets a supplier has to be informed about. Amazon, for example,  has an
informational advantage concerning the particularities of the online book market. Therefore,
                                                
24 See also Steinfield, Whitten 1999.
25 Be they independent intermediaries or fully integrated subsidiaries.publishers rather supply  this particular market via this particular intermediary than set up
their own B-2-C e-commerce distribution network.
The conclusion that intermediaries are under threat rests on the assumption that all traditional
local markets are substituted for by one single electronic market in which all producers and all
consumers interact directly.
26 Any information that is relevant for the producers would than
have to be communicated to them via relative prices and in direct interaction with other market
participants (e.g. online discussion groups, online customer care programs, user groups etc.).
Even though the costs of direct interaction with all other market participants  are drastically
reduced due to the communication and integration effect it seems unlikely that this could be a
substitute for specialised  local  expertise. The rising  numbers of online bookstores  (e.g.
topically or locally focused) suggests  that the informational efficiency of intermediation
prevails even in the world of e-commerce.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the producer has the same capacities as the intermediary in
processing this information and spotting profit opportunities based on it. The success of
Amazon suggests that producers are not always best suited to be the first to spot  profit
opportunities. Complete centralisation of information gathering, organising, and evaluating,
therefore, seems to be an unlikely consequence of the diffusion of electronic commerce.
INTERNAL PRODUCTION VS. PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATION
Disintermediation can also result from a decision of the principal (e.g. the producer) to provide
the intermediation service under consideration internally. How will the diffusion of electronic
commerce influence this strategic decision? Intermediation is efficient as long as the marginal
efficiency gains resulting from outsourcing the task of information gathering, organising, and
                                                
26 Alternatively, intermediaries might disappear after they have been acquired by the more centralised producer.
Then the service of intermediation is produced internally. The following section intends to analyse the effects of
the diffusion of electronic commerce in this respect.evaluating  compensate the principal for her share of the  agency  costs  and  the  agent￿s
compensation at the margin. Therefore, disintermediation by internal production occurs if one
of the three following statements is true, ceteris paribus:
I.  Electronic commerce reduces the marginal costs of internal production of the task under
consideration.
II.  Electronic commerce increases the agent￿s marginal costs of production of the task under
consideration.
  Consequently, the existing intermediaries would lose their competitive advantage in gathering,
organising, and evaluating information on local  particularities. The communication and the
integration effects of electronic commerce clearly mark it as a process innovation rather than a
product innovation. As such it will reduce the agents￿ marginal costs as well as those of the
principal  and might leave comparative  advantage unaffected. For the communication and
integration effect to become fully operational the relevant information has to be digitised and
fed into the network. Therefore, the marginal efficiency gains from delegation would still be
positive.
  The brokerage effect implies that the principal has direct access to his current customers.
Therefore, the principal would be informed about price changes immediately. But the causes
of these changes are still not known to him. Only if all relevant information could be gathered
by the principal as efficiently as by the agent, disintermediation would result. Although the
costs of information  gathering via online sources  (e.g. online discussion groups, online
customer care programs etc.) will be reduced due to the communication and integration effect it
seems highly unlikely that  (i)  all  relevant information can  actually be gathered via online
sources and (ii) as efficiently as via an intermediary.
III. Electronic commerce increases marginal agency costs  and/or the agent￿s compensation at
the margin.The literature
27, though, points in the opposite direction: Marginal agency costs decrease due
to the communication and integration effect of electronic commerce because monitoring costs
are reduced. Given the market is sufficiently competitive, the aforementioned reduction of
marginal costs of the agent￿s intermediation service will reduce his compensation as well.
To conclude: As the marginal costs of internal production and the agent￿s marginal costs are
both affected by the diffusion of electronic commerce the effect on the comparative advantage
is ambiguous. But there  are no clear indications  that the marginal  efficiency  gains  from
intermediation would be reduced. At the same time, the decrease in monitoring costs and the
agent￿s compensation provide a strong case for a shift from internal production to principal
agent relations. ￿Increased use of IT in the retail industry has contributed to an increase in the
importance of retailers and credit companies as sources of consumer information.￿ (Sarkar,
Butler,  Steinfield  1995, p. 7). Disintermediation by internal production is an unlikely
consequence of the diffusion of electronic commerce.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Although a trend towards disintermediation seems so obvious to many commentators on e-
commerce the results of this paper clearly  show that disintermediation due to electronic
commerce cannot be generalised to all intermediation services. The Threatened Intermediation
Hypothesis is too simplistic. Three intermediation services ￿ which have received little
attention in the literature so far - were identified: (1) hold inventory to provide the service of
immediacy and insurance against systematic valuation risk, (2) reduce asymmetric information
by establishing a reputation, (3) gather, organise, and evaluate information which is dispersed
in society. The analysis of the effects of the diffusion of electronic commerce on the demand
for these services yielded the following results:
                                                
27 See, for example, Benjamin, Wigand 1995, p. 65.The diffusion of electronic commerce will not have any systematic influence on the arrival
rates of buy and sell orders nor on individual risk and/or time preferences. Therefore, the
demand for the services of immediacy and insurance against systematic valuation risk will not
decrease.
As electronic markets increase the number of participants in any single market the probability
to trade with the same counterparty repeatedly decreases. This  can reduce the payoffs to
establishing a reputation for individual sellers. Due to the communication and integration
effect the task of monitoring can be shifted  more  easily from the individual  buyer to a
specialised intermediary who monitors the performance of the party that has an informational
advantage. Also sellers profit from the delegation of the task of establishing a reputation. The
higher transaction volume of the intermediary enables him to reduce the costs of establishing a
reputation per transaction, to increase the credibility of his commitment and to avoid the
duplication of efforts among sellers. Therefore, electronic commerce is more likely to increase
the demand for this particular intermediation service.
Gathering, organising, and evaluating information is one of the main functions of an
intermediary as knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and space is dispersed in
society. The diffusion of electronic commerce will not reduce the demand for this particular
intermediation service. The informational efficiency of intermediation will prevail. Complete
centralisation of information gathering, organising, and evaluating seems unlikely.
Regarding disintermediation by internal provision of the intermediation services by traders no
indication was found that electronic commerce would reduce the marginal efficiency gains form
engaging in a principal agent relation nor increase its marginal costs to the principal. In all three
of the cases analysed intermediaries would continue to have a comparative advantage in the
provision of the intermediation services. This is intuitively appealing since electronic
commerce is a process innovation and can be utilised by intermediaries as effectively as by
other traders.The conclusion of this paper deviates considerably from the literature because (i)
intermediation services were identified which received  very little attention in the existing
literature and (ii) the relative importance of these services is likely to out-weigh the simple
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